Opening Up the Politics of Knowledge and Power in Bioscience by Stirling, Andy
Perspective
Opening Up the Politics of Knowledge and Power in
Bioscience
Andy Stirling*
SPRU and STEPS Centre, University of Sussex, Brighton, United Kingdom
Recent years have seen growing world-
wide discussions, experiments, and expec-
tations around various kinds of public
engagement in the biosciences. This is
especially so, in the governance of bio-
technology—in research policy, risk regu-
lation, and adoption of new innovations.
How one defines public engagement
necessarily affects the course of political,
media, and civil society debate on these
issues. Yet critics and even some propo-
nents often misunderstand underlying
rationales and imperatives for engagement
[1]. Strong opposition persists on the part
of some policymakers in the ostensible
name of science, even to the most modest
forms of citizen participation in decisions
about regulation or research [2]. Where
dialogue is supported between scientists,
policy makers, stakeholders, and members
of the public, it is often for contrasting
reasons [3]—reflecting motivations of
some leading figures in science governance
to control, as much as respect, contending
public interests [4]. Prominent experts
have questioned whether ordinary people
have the right or even the ability to engage
on complex technical issues [5]. Attempts
to include stakeholders are criticized as
slowing down innovation [6]. Some scien-
tists fear that irrational anxieties over
particular issues mean that public engage-
ment will lead to indiscriminately techno-
phobic or anti-science results [7]. How
might we interpret these attitudes and
controversies and better understand why
public engagement matters? What are the
practical policy consequences?
This paper identifies different grounds
for supporting particular elements of
public engagement, irrespective of con-
text. It describes how diverse qualities of
participatory practice arise in different
circumstances. The starting point is that
the realities of technological change—
particularly as they relate to policy
making—demand a move away from
traditional exclusive, specialist approach-
es. This means relinquishing the blanket
pro-innovation rhetoric used by many in
high-level policy making: portraying tech-
nological progress as what Lord Alec
Broers (as President of the Royal Acade-
my of Engineering) described in his
globally broadcast BBC Reith lectures as
a ‘‘race to advance technology’’—a single
track to an essentially inevitable future
[8]. This linear notion conceals the
continually branching nature of techno-
logical change. It hides the ways impor-
tant political choices over alternative
directions for innovation are made at
every juncture—and should be as subject
as other areas of policy, to democratic
participation and accountability. In this
sense, then, various kinds of public
engagement in the biosciences can be
seen to offer means to reconcile tensions
between the otherwise-estranged Enlight-
enment values of science and democracy.
In short, greater public engagement offers
an opportunity to be more rigorous about
the uncertainties in bioscience innovation
and more accountable about the exercise
of power.
In introducing this series of commen-
taries [9], the editors follow others in
distinguishing between three broad ratio-
nales and imperatives for public engage-
ment [10,11]. First, a substantive ap-
proach tries to identify the so-called
‘‘best’’ outcomes—trajectories for technol-
ogy that respect broadly shared public
values like maximizing public benefits,
reducing health impacts, increasing envi-
ronmental sustainability, or enhancing
wellbeing. Details are ambiguous and
contestible, but such widely debated aspi-
rations do offer nontrivial, generally self-
evidently positive ends. Second, by con-
trast, instrumental objectives presume
(often implicitly) that a specific outcome
is desirable—one favoured by particular
interests and perspectives (for instance,
individual businesses, agencies, or pressure
groups). These approaches therefore focus
simply on the means towards unques-
tioned ends—like fostering public under-
standing, trust, reputation or acceptance,
or giving voice to opposition—all with
respect to some particular option or
institution. Whether or not one approves
of such closure from ends to means,
depends on the inclination to support the
particular ends thereby privileged. Finally,
normative approaches are not primarily
concerned with outcomes at all—neither
as ends nor means—but with the partic-
ipatory processes themselves. These value
such qualities as independence, openness,
accessibility, legitimacy, and accountabili-
ty [12]. Normative evaluations of public
engagement processes can also depend on
whether they are structured or spontane-
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uninvited [13]. Thus, decisions about how
best to view, design, or choose among
modes of public engagement depend on
perspective as well as context.
But in asking ‘‘whether, and under what
conditions, it is possible to engage the
public in scientific issues in meaningful
ways?’’ [9], the editors risk being misun-
derstood. This might be taken to imply
that, whilst the public may display diver-
gent views on particular technologies, this
is not the case when it comes to more
general perspectives on the role of public
engagement concerning these technolo-
gies. Although conclusions may vary by
case, there is an implication (at least in
principle) that objectively correct answers
exist at the most general level. Such an
impression reflects a current trend under
which public engagement has grown
increasingly structured and subject to
accreditation, institutionalisation, profes-
sionalization, and managerial evaluation.
Together, this trend tends to suppress the
intrinsically political dimensions in the
governance of science, which requires
flexibility to accommodate diverse values
and viewpoints. Yet, in reality, the answers
to the questions posed in this series are
partly in the eyes of beholders—hinging
not only on particular conditions, but also
on divergent political perspectives under
any given condition [14].
For instance, in deciding which innova-
tions to pursue in agriculture (technolog-
ical or social), it cannot be assumed that
any one aim is paramount—whether the
issue is respecting the cultural attributes of
food, maximizing world protein produc-
tion, commercial revenues in supply
chains, combating climate change, or
sustaining hard-pressed livelihoods. All
are valid concerns, but not all can be
maximized together. Although participa-
tion may improve mutual understanding
and appreciation among stakeholders,
even the most inclusive or co-operative
practices cannot definitively reconcile un-
derlying contrasting interests. Yet such
diverging interests have implications not
only for which innovations to chose, but
also for what counts as ‘‘appropriate’’
participatory practice. These political di-
mensions of public engagement can easily
be missed by all interested parties—
proponents with romantic visions of en-
gagement, practitioners with diverse meth-
odological commitments, sponsors with
contending expedient interests, and pur-
veyors of blanket criticism of public
engagement, who fail to discriminate
between the crucial details of process and
context [15].
One way to transcend these differences
(withoutpresuming toresolvethemoneway
or another), is to begin with the commit-
ment that governance of bioscience should
be informed by the most appropriate
knowledges. In public engagement, as in
other forms of policy appraisal (like risk
assessment or cost-benefit analysis), this
raises questions over the nature of different
knowledge bases. Figure 1 offers a stylized
picture of fundamental ways in which
knowledge conditions bearing on bioscience
policy may be seen as problematic—and
points in each case to illustrative roles for
engagement. For ease of understanding,
Figure 1 is structured according to the
conventional parameters of expert risk
regulation: probabilities and magnitudes
[16]. Each presents a distinct dimension
under which anyone can be more or less
confident intheir knowledge. It is important
to appreciate that this is not a taxonomy of
conditions under which knowledge is objec-
tively better or worse. The point is rather
that: how a given body of knowledge is
regarded is inherently subjective. In partic-
ular, Figure 1 shows how public engage-
ment is relevant under all conditions and
perspectives, although specific features may
vary in significant ways.
The top left quadrant shows the classic
condition of risk—where there is felt to be
Figure 1. Roles for public engagement under different knowledge conditions.
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1001233.g001
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both magnitudes of possible outcomes and
their respective probabilities. Each dimen-
sion can be quantified and multiplied to
yield formal expressions of risk. This in
turn allows optimization across trade-offs
between contending objectives, values,
and possibilities—thus, the argument goes,
informing better policy [17]. One might
think that this kind of conventional
calculative risk assessment would find little
value from public engagement. And it is
on this basis that a stark divide is routinely
drawn between the ostensibly objective,
rational expertise employed in risk assess-
ment and the apparently less informed,
more emotional risk perceptions of the
public. In this view, public risk perceptions
must be managed as spurious departures
from the rational norms of experts.
This well-established rigid separation
between assessment and management of
risk is consistent with the ‘‘one track’’ view
that knowledge and innovation in any
given area must necessarily follow single
optimal trajectories. If one believes that
science discovers facts and that facts
determine technology, then there is little
latitude for meaningful social engagement
on the direction of technology change.
Under this narrow ‘‘risk’’ view, the
function of public engagement is merely
instrumental, a means to implement
inevitable progress. Engagement is then
useful only for securing public understand-
ing, trust, and acceptance of whatever
technological developments happen to be
currently emerging—that is, for bringing
public perceptions in line with risks as
defined by the experts.
Even under such constrained instru-
mental risk-based views, however, biosci-
ence presents a wide range of more
substantive governance challenges. These
challenges are clearly not purely calculable
but involve value judgments. How to:
Decide which technology or policy options
to include? Weigh contrasting benefits and
harms? Balance overall pros and cons?
Arbitrate their distribution across society?
Determine real-world conditions of use?
Derive and aggregate relevant probabili-
ties? Assign optimal levels of protection?
Whether acknowledged or not, even the
most narrowly science-centric and techno-
cratic notions of risk assessment require
qualitative deliberation on such matters.
Whether expert or public, subjective
judgment is as essential as any kind of
objective rationality. This highlights a role
for the type of detailed, open, and
accountable oversight and validation of-
fered by substantive and normative con-
cepts of public engagement [18].
This case for noninstrumental public
engagement further increases under con-
ditions of uncertainty (the lower left of
Figure 1). The long-established strict
definition of this state of uncertainty is
that it affords no firm basis for probabil-
ities [19]. Yet the facility of methods like
Bayesian calculus lead to the assertion
‘‘…it is always possible to obtain a
probability…’’ [20]. As a result, the term
uncertainty is often stretched to describe
even relatively tractable conditions under
which probabilities yield determinate an-
swers—in effect confusing uncertainty
with risk. When practitioners of a partic-
ular quantitative method insist on using
their favoured techniques even when they
are inapplicable, the result is a deep
misunderstanding—as prevalent in biosci-
ence as elsewhere—understating indeter-
minacy and exaggerating the definitive
power of calculation [21].
The point is not that it is impossible to
assign different subjective probability func-
tions under uncertainty, but that probabi-
listic reasoning under uncertainty cannot
yield a single objectively aggregate value.
Here, quantitative methods should not be
used to give misleadingly definitive im-
pressions of confidence. Yet they may still
offer powerful tools—especially where
they acknowledge subjectivity [22]. In
other words—under uncertainty—calcula-
tion can only serve, not drive, assessments.
Scientific rigour demands instead more
open-ended forms of uncertainty heuris-
tics, interval analysis, sensitivity testing,
and scenario assessment—each requiring
attention to the differing conditions that
may frame the question at hand [23].
Here the substantive roles for public
engagement become immediately clear. It
is only through participatory practices
catalysed by, focused on, or relevant to,
more open-ended methods, that substan-
tive policy appraisal (focusing on salient
public concerns) is most likely to be
effective. For instance, deliberation can
then be more easily directed at key
questions such as scrutinizing need, re-
solving new options, maximizing best case
opportunities, ameliorating worst case
possibilities, highlighting ‘‘no regrets’’
strategies, or identifying some intermedi-
ate precautionary balance. Regulatory
experience repeatedly reveals how artifi-
cial reduction of uncertainty to risk can
compromise public safety when an unfore-
seen hazard arises. This was the case, for
instance, with stratospheric ozone deple-
tion, transmissible spongiform encepha-
lopathies, and endocrine-disrupting chem-
icals. In each case, early warnings were
noticed first outside formal risk assessment.
The way to remedy this, is to ‘‘broaden
out’’ regulatory appraisal—extending at-
tention to a wider range of options, issues,
conditions, uncertainties, scenarios, meth-
ods, disciplines, and perspectives than are
conventionally included in technical risk
assessment. This helps mitigate the ob-
scuring of emerging understandings and
early warnings that can be caused in
simple reductions to probabilities and
magnitudes and aggregating across differ-
ent circumstances and dimensions [24].
It can be difficult for those wed to
probabilitistic approaches, to accept the
distinction between risk and uncertainty.
So the horizontal axis in Figure 1—
highlighting intractabilities in defining
possibilities themselves—may be even
more unpalatable. These challenges of
ambiguity differ from uncertainty, because
they apply even after outcomes have
already occurred. For example, much of
the controversy over genetically modified
organisms concerns not the likelihood of
some agreed form of harm, but funda-
mentally different understandings of what
harm actually means (e.g., in terms of
threats variously to human health, ecolog-
ical integrity, agronomic diversity, indige-
nous food cultures, sustainable rural live-
lihoods, vulnerability to climate change,
control of intellectual property, or global
industrial distribution). Likewise in other
areas, contrasting pictures arise in focusing
on different harmful mechanisms, toxic
endpoints, or pathogenic vectors [24].
How then does one define, bound, parti-
tion, and prioritize different possibilities?
What sorts of questions should regulators
ask: Do we need this? What would be
best? What would be better? What would
be safest? What would be safe enough?
What would be tolerable? Or (as is
routine), is some particular market devel-
opment, merely ‘‘not worse than current
worst practice’’? Each can yield radically
different answers [25].
Although assessment of some special-
ized questions—involving, for example,
incidence of specific occupational disor-
ders, childhood illness, congenital morbid-
ity, environmental disease—may be seen
quite fairly as largely a matter for
expertise, deciding between and within
such questions still requires intrinsically
subjective judgments. What kind of exper-
tise can plausibly settle the relative impor-
tance of compared levels of, say: Injury or
illness? Harm to adults or children?
Worker or citizen? Present or future
generations? Humans or animals? Here,
Nobel-winning work in rational choice
theory shows, as a matter of logic, that
there exists no general form of analysis
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answers across specific cases [26]. The
same holds for other kinds of ambiguity: it
is misleading to claim that single definitive
science-based decisions are possible—sci-
ence alone cannot reconcile the range of
contrasting, plausibly preferable outcomes.
Again, substantive public engagement—
symmetrically addressing diverse portfolios
of choices [27]—offers a path to facilitat-
ing both validity and legitimacy under
these conditions [28].
Here, substantive public engagement
requires not just interactions between
different groups of experts but rich
varieties of encounter between experts
and nonspecialists. Indeed, the terms
under which different disciplines them-
selves engage is itself often at issue.
Institutional dominance, conflict, and ex-
clusion all feature prominently in past
histories of regulatory failure [24]. When
and how, for example, should social
scientists play a role? Merely in the final
communication of results? In helping elicit
options, weights or priorities as inputs? In
investigating issues of use, practice, or
compliance? Or in illuminating the social
processes of science itself, examining the
dynamics of knowledge and power? Each
holds divergent implications. All are com-
bined in enabling participatory delibera-
tion. Though technical details may be
inaccessible to the general public, under-
lying political dynamics between academ-
ic, governmental, and commercial institu-
tions are broadly familiar to nonspecialists,
but often marginalised by specialists. In
this way, the life sciences are little different
to other specialisms such as security,
economy, or law—and should arguably
be equally subject to democratic account-
ability. Under ambiguity, public engage-
ment offers a way to integrate the wide
diversity of public viewpoints into policy-
making with a fine-grain detail that is
typically not achievable in parliamentary
or legislative proceedings (let alone expert
assessment alone).
Beyond risk, uncertainty, and ambiguity
lies the final aspect of problematic knowl-
edge in bioscience governance—ignorance
(lower right of Figure 1) [29]. This is
where public engagement is particularly
valuable. Here, the challenge is not just
about the prospect of radical surprise—
‘‘unknown unknowns’’ like newly recog-
nized kinds of adverse outcome or harmful
mechanism mentioned above [24]. The
predicament is further amplified by the
way scientific and technological develop-
ments—including the fabric of knowledge
itself—can be conditioned by expectations
and power [11]. This is because research
and innovation (social as much as techno-
logical) proceed through continually
branching choices. Many different disci-
plines have shown how, once chosen, each
pathway becomes channeled in ways that
are difficult to reverse. Alternative paths
are crowded out, other opportunities
foreclosed. History is littered with exam-
ples—like QWERTY keyboards, VHS
videos, narrow-gauge rail, urban automo-
biles, AC electricity, light-water reactors,
and PC software. Even the most compet-
itive markets repeatedly lock in to retro-
spectively clearly inadvisable choices.
Whilst real world complexities ensure
some degree of diversity, the repeated
lesson of history is that society cannot
commit to any single trajectory without
diminishing the potential for others [30].
Artificially blinkered ignorance is itself one
of the key mechanisms of closure [21].
And those pathways of change favoured
by the least powerful are typically the most
excluded [31].
In other words, scientific and techno-
logical progress is not about one-track
competitive races to discover in each field
what is self-evidently better. It is an
exploratory process that closes down, as
well as opens up, alternative possibilities.
And, in a globalising world, the stakes are
further raised by corporate concentration
and pressures for harmonization and
standardization (as championed by the
World Trade Organization). For instance,
though alternative trajectories are biolog-
ically feasible in agricultural seed produc-
tion—and potentially economically viable
and socially realizable—incentive struc-
tures for large corporations in global
markets favour strategies that assert intel-
lectual property (IP) or otherwise maxi-
mize profits in a supply chain. This helps
explain the conventional industrial em-
phasis on hybrid varieties and preference
for IP-intensive transgenics. Other techni-
cal approaches may also be relatively
neglected for narrow commercial reasons,
like forms of cisgenics (using similar
techniques within species and varieties)
or apomixis (allowing greater farmer
selection using asexual reproduction) or
marker-assisted methods (augmenting con-
ventional breeding with advanced genet-
ics). Equally knowledge-intensive social
and institutional innovations are even
more disadvantaged—especially those em-
phasising the interests of marginal groups
(like participatory breeding, noncommer-
cial extension practices, or microfinanced
indigenous production). In these ways,
momentum along particular innovation
pathways is driven more by political
economy than scientific inevitability.
These path-dependent choices are not just
about ‘‘sound science’’ and technical
optimization, but the exercise of political
power [29].
The key to substantive understanding of
public engagement as a response to
ignorance, then, lies in appreciating these
real world dynamics of science and
technology choice. Diverse, open, self-
defining forms of public engagement offer
means equally towards rigorous apprecia-
tion and democratic accountability in the
social appraisal of innovation pathways. In
such ways, the central focus of bioscience
governance can expand beyond questions
merely about ‘‘how much?,’’ ‘‘how fast?,’’
‘‘how costly?,’’ or ‘‘who leads?’’—towards
broader, more open-ended, and demand-
ing political challenges around ‘‘which
way?,’’ ‘‘who says?,’’ and ‘‘why?’’ This
extends far beyond instrumental views of
top-down participation supporting regula-
tory assessment in any given area to
optimise a presumed one-track race to
the future. Yet this is where much practice
and advocacy of public engagement also
falls short. By emphasising consensus or
settled verdicts, structured, ‘‘invited’’ en-
gagement can thwart genuine substantive
public participation as much as any
narrow risk assessment—and can also
reinforce the closure of discussion around
single trajectories. This is especially so,
when engagement presumes to settle
within highly designed deliberative proce-
dures essentially political matters of choice
[11].
A very different picture emerges when
public engagement is undertaken not to
force consensual prescriptive recommen-
dations, but to map out alternative path-
ways—revealing the detailed political im-
plications of each [27]. The aim here is to
catalyse and provoke—rather than substi-
tute or suppress—wider public discourse.
Only in this way, may we hope to
reconcile the otherwise contending imper-
atives of normative legitimacy, substantive
rigour, and instrumental efficiency with
which this paper began. Decisions will still
be made, but they will be more explicitly
(and honestly) political: not hiding behind
(and subverting) science through simplistic,
misleading one-track, ‘‘sound science’’ or
‘‘pro-technology’’ language. So, far from
being more protracted or expensive,
avoiding pretence at definitive closure
can—both in analysis and deliberation—
better inform, clarify and streamline
political decision making. It is by opening
up social choices, that public engagement
in policy appraisal can simultaneously
enhance robustness (by acknowledging
uncertainty, ambiguity, and ignorance)
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ability (by highlighting judgments).
Despite the many different forms, roles,
and perspectives around public engage-
ment, then, it is clear that (in bioscience
governance, as elsewhere), the real value
of more inclusive participation lies in
opening up—rather than closing down—
a healthy, mature, accountable democratic
politics of technology choice [32]. So, the
challenge lies not so much in procedural
design, as in the creation of a dynamic
new political arena—in which reasoned
scepticism is as valued in public debates
about technology as it is in science itself. In
this way, we may hope to renew and
recombine two strangely sundered aspects
of the Enlightenment: science and democ-
racy. Far from presenting obstacles (as
often implied), it is the emergence of a
diverse vibrant new ‘‘fifth estate’’ of
practices and institutions around public
engagement that best embodies a true
Enlightenment vision of progress. Indeed,
in bioscience as elsewhere, this exercise of
greater social agency over the directions
for knowledge and innovation moves
beyond enlightenment over the mere
possibility of social advance, towards real
enablement of a greater diversity of
directions for human progress [33].
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